Complaint; Filed by: Ocean Park One, LLC (Plaintiff); Ocean Park Two, LLC (Plaintiff); Ocean Park Three, LLC (Plaintiff); As to: DCT Smart Stretch Inc. (Defendant) July 31, 2024 (2024)

Case Info

Parties

Case

YU ZHI ZHAO VS HENRY LEE, ET AL.

Jul 31, 2024 |Peter A. Hernandez |Other Real Property (not eminent domain, landlord/tenant, foreclosure) (General Jurisdiction) |Other Real Property (not eminent domain, landlord/tenant, foreclosure) (General Jurisdiction) |24PSCV02472

Case

VALENTINA ASATRYAN, ET AL. VS SOURIK GASPARIAN, ET AL.

Jul 30, 2024 |Jon R. Takasugi |Wrongful Eviction Case (General Jurisdiction) |Wrongful Eviction Case (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV18952

Case

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ACTING BY AND THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION VS SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY, ET AL.

Jul 26, 2024 |Stephen P. Pfahler |Eminent Domain/Condemnation (General Jurisdiction) |Eminent Domain/Condemnation (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV18679

Case

2900 WILSHIRE, LLC VS JEREMY LEE GREGORY

Jul 19, 2024 |Randolph M. Hammock |Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV18008

Case

TWONGTIP PUNLERTPATHANAKON, ET AL. VS XIANGGE HUANG

Jul 29, 2024 |Bryant Y. Yang |Landlord-Tenant Habitability (e.g., bed bugs, mold, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |Landlord-Tenant Habitability (e.g., bed bugs, mold, etc.) (General Jurisdiction) |24PSCV02410

Case

CALIFORNIA CAPITAL INSURANCE COMPANY AS SUBROGEE OF ITS INSURED VAN VILLAS, LLC, ET AL. VS LOS ANGELES DEPARTMENT OF WATER AND POWER

Jul 29, 2024 |Melvin D. Sandvig |Eminent Domain/Condemnation (General Jurisdiction) |Eminent Domain/Condemnation (General Jurisdiction) |24CHCV02711

Case

LUCKY DEALS LLC VS JEFFREY NOURAFSHAN, ET AL.

Jul 30, 2024 |Kevin C. Brazile |Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |Breach of Rental/Lease Contract (not unlawful detainer or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |24STCV18852

Case

INTERTEX PLUM CANYON, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY VS RICHARD VAN NGO

Jul 26, 2024 |Tricia J. Taylor |Unlawful Detainer/Commercial (not drugs or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |Unlawful Detainer/Commercial (not drugs or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |24CHCV02679

Case

JOSEPH KAMKAR VS OSCAR PARADA

Jul 31, 2024 |C. Virginia Keeny |Unlawful Detainer/Residential (not drugs or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |Unlawful Detainer/Residential (not drugs or wrongful eviction) (General Jurisdiction) |24VECV03617

Ruling

PLANET HOME LENDING, LLC VS RUDY RAMIRO DE LEON JR., AN INDIVIDUAL

Aug 01, 2024 |24STCV02894

Case Number: 24STCV02894 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 PLANET HOME LENDING, LLC, Plaintiff, vs. RUDY RAMIRO DE LEON JR, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 24STCV02894 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFFS REQUEST FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT Plaintiff Planet Home Lending, LLC (Plaintiff) requests entry of default judgment against Defendant Rudy Ramiro De Leon Jr. Plaintiff seeks judgment set forth in Plaintiffs proposed judgment for reformation of instrument. The Court grants Plaintiffs request for judicial notice. However, the Court notes a few defects with the submitted default judgment package. The proposed judgment provides, inter alia, as follows: 3. That certain Grant Deed recorded on July 14, 2022, as Document No. 20220722663 in the Official Records of Los Angeles is hereby reformed to reflect the true intention of the parties thereto; 4. That certain Deed of Trust recorded on July 14, 2022, as Document No. 20220722664 in the Official Records of Los Angeles is hereby reformed to reflect the true intention of the parties thereto& However, the proposed judgment does not clearly state how the subject Grant Deed and Deed of Trust will be reformed. It is not clear from the proposed judgment that the Grant Deed and Deed of Trust will be reformed to add the correct spelling of plat to the legal description. It appears that the prayer for relief of Plaintiffs Complaint more clearly sets forth the relief sought. In addition, the legal description of Parcel 2 in paragraph 2 of the proposed judgment references a so foot wide road. This appears to be a typo. The legal descriptions contained in the subject Grant Deed and Deed of Trust reference a 60 FOOT WIDE ROAD. (OConnell Decl., ¶¶ 5-6, Exs. 1-2.) Based on the foregoing, the Court continues the hearing on the status conference review of default judgment package to _____________, 2024 at 10:00 a.m. in Dept. 50. On or before _____________, 2024, Plaintiff shall file and serve a revised proposed judgment that addresses the defects identified above. DATED: August 1, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Ruling

JESSICA PURNER, ET AL. VS GREYSTONE PROPERTIES, LLC, ET AL.

Aug 05, 2024 |22SMCV01816

Case Number: 22SMCV01816 Hearing Date: August 5, 2024 Dept: P Tentative Ruling Purner, et al. v. Greystone Properties, LLC, et al., Case No. 22SMCV01816 Hearing Date: August 5, 2024 Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint UNOPPOSED In this habitability action arising from bed bug infestation, plaintiff tenants seek for leave to file a first amended complaint, adding three new causes for actions. Leave to amend is permitted under Code of Civil Procedure sections 473(a) and 576. The policy favoring amendment and resolving all matters in the same dispute is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified. . .. Although courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial [citations], this policy should be applied only where no prejudice is shown to the adverse party . . .. [citation]. A different result is indicated where inexcusable delay and probable prejudice to the opposing party is shown. [Citation]. Magpali v. Farmers Group (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 487. A motion for leave to amend a pleading must comply with California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324, which requires a declaration to set forth what allegations are to be added and where, and what new evidence was discovered warranting amendment and why the amendment was not made earlier. The motion must include (1) a proposed and numbered amendment, (2) specifications by reference to pages and lines the allegations that would be deleted and added, and (3) a declaration specifying the effect, necessity and propriety of the amendments, date of discovery and reasons for delay. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), (b). The motion complies with CRC rule 3.1324. Plaintiffs counsel states the deposition of Josh Wolf on May 14, 2024, revealed additional facts and violations of Plaintiffs rights by the defendant. Bartlett Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiffs specify the effect, necessity, and propriety of the amendment because they state the proposed FAC seeks to clean up allegations and errors in the Complaint while adding three new causes of action: 1) violation of the Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance; 2) negligence; and 3) breach of contract based on an illegal contract. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. Plaintiffs specify where the edits would be made by providing a blue-lined copy of the proposed FAC showing the changes between the proposed FAC and the complaint. Id. ¶ 7; Exh. B. Finally, Bartlett states the amendment was not made earlier because plaintiffs were unable to get an agreement with defendants to file a joint stipulation. Id. ¶¶ 4, 9. Defendants would not be prejudiced as they have not taken any depositions of the plaintiffs and do not file an opposition. Id. ¶ 3. GRANTED.

Ruling

AARON MARZWELL VS LESLIE HERRERA, ET AL.

Aug 01, 2024 |21STCV08577

Case Number: 21STCV08577 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 AARON MARZWELL, Plaintiff, vs. LFSLIE HERRLRA, individually and dba MADISON TENANTS UNION, et al. Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV08577 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION Background Plaintiff Aaron Marzwell filed this action on March 4, 2021 against a number of defendants. On February 28, 2023, Plaintiffs Aaron Marzwell; Roey Marzwell, a minor, by and through Aaron Marzwell as Guardian ad litem; Annette Marzwell, a minor, by and through Aaron Marzwell as Guardian ad litem; and Leo Marzwell, a minor, by and through Aaron Marzwell as Guardian ad litem (collectively, Plaintiffs)[1] filed the operative First Amended Complaint (FAC) against Defendants Leslie Herrera, individually and dba Madison Tenants Union; Guillermo Garcia, individually and dba Madison Tenants Union; Ana Maria Garcia, individually and dba Madison Tenants Union; Reina P. Estrada, individually and dba Madison Tenants Union; Maria Ponce De Leon, individually and dba Madison Tenants Union; Tony Ramirez, individually and dba Los Angeles Tenants Union; and Maria Luisa Xocoy, individually and dba Los Angeles Tenants Union. The FAC alleges causes of action for (1) damages for trespass and injunction and (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Leslie Hererra, Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, Reina Estrada, Maria Ponce de Leon, and Maria Xocoy[2] (collectively, Defendants) now move for summary judgment, or in the alternative, summary adjudication. Plaintiffs oppose. Request for Judicial Notice The Court grants Plaintiffs request for judicial notice. Evidentiary Objections The Court rules on Plaintiffs amended evidentiary objections as follows: Objection to the Declaration of Guillermo Garcia Objection No. 1: overruled Objection to the Declaration of Ana Maria Garcia Objection No. 3: overruled Objection to the Declaration of Leslie Herrera Objection No. 1: overruled Objection to the Declaration of Maria Ponce De Leon Objection No. 1: overruled Objections to the Declaration of Reina Estrada Objection No. 3: overruled Objection No. 6: overruled Objection No. 7: overruled Objection No. 9: overruled Objection No. 10: sustained Objections to the Declaration of Maria Xocoy Objection No. 1: overruled Objection No. 3: overruled Objection No. 9: overruled Objection No. 10: overruled Legal Standard [A] motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A party may move for summary adjudication as to one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty, if the party contends that the cause of action has no merit, that there is no affirmative defense to the cause of action, that there is no merit to an affirmative defense as to any cause of action, that there is no merit to a claim for damages, as specified in Section 3294 of the Civil Code, or that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. A motion for summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense, a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (f)(1).) The moving party bears the initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.) If the moving party carries this burden, the burden shifts to the opposing party to make a prima facie showing that a triable issue of material fact exists. (Ibid.) Courts liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.) When a defendant seeks summary judgment or summary adjudication, he/she must show either (1) that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established; or (2) that there is a complete defense to that cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(2).) /// /// /// Discussion A. Allegations of the FAC In the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that [t]he incidents that are the subjects of [the] First Amended Complaint occurred in the vicinity of and at the premises located at 11502 Missouri Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90025 (hereinafter the Property). (FAC, ¶ 6.) Aaron Marzwell is the owner of the Property. (FAC, ¶ 11.) Aaron Marzwell is a member of 1155 N. Madison Avenue, LLC (Madison Avenue LLC). (FAC, ¶ 9.) Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, and Reina P. Estrada were defendants in certain unlawful detainer actions instituted by Madison Avenue LLC against them. (FAC, ¶ 9.) Plaintiffs allege that the acts which are hereinafter alleged were undertaken by Defendants, and each of them, in retaliation and retribution for Madison Avenue LLC having commenced unlawful detainer actions against said tenants, and were undertaken by Defendants, and each of them, to use force, threats, trespass and intimidation to coerce more favorable results in said unlawful detainer actions& (FAC, ¶ 10.) Plaintiffs allege that [o]n or about January 16, 2021, Defendants, and each of them, intentionally entered upon the Property and trespassed thereon without the consent of Plaintiffs. At said time and place, Defendants, and each of them, taped flyers to the garage of the Property using duct tape, all without the consent of Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 12.) On or about February 20, 2021, Defendants, and each of them, further intentionally caused damage to the garage of the Property by using wallpaper glue on the garage doors, and also by gluing signs to the stucco and wood garage doors and fences on the Property, all without the consent of Plaintiffs. (FAC, ¶ 13.) On or about February 20, 2021, Defendants, and each of them, through one of the Defendants who was masked, and whom Plaintiffs are informed and believe and thereon allege was the leader of a group of protestors, climbed and jumped over a 7-foot wall in front of the Property, and then opened the gate so that other members of the group could push furniture into the entryway, blocking the ability of Plaintiffs to escape. This same individual, using a blowhorn, loudly shouted profanities and threats of physical violence, approached Plaintiffs front door to the Property and attempted to gain entry into the inside of the Property. (FAC, ¶ 16.) Defendants, and each of them, through said individual, repeatedly attempted to open the front door for the purpose of gaining entry, banged violently on the glass door, and yelled profanities at the Minors[3], as they attempted to escape by running from the area of the front door. Said individual did not leave the Property until the police were called to and arrived at the Property. (FAC, ¶ 16.) B. Arguments Pertaining to Both Causes of Action First Cause of Action for Trespass As to the first cause of action for trespass, Plaintiffs allege that on or about January 16, 2021 and February 20, 2021, Defendants trespassed upon the subject Property. (FAC, ¶¶ 12-13.) The essence of the cause of action for trespass is an unauthorized entry onto the land of another. (Civic Western Corp. v. Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66 Cal.App.3d 1, 16.) Defendants assert that they are entitled to summary adjudication on the first cause of action for trespass because none of them ever personally trespassed on Plaintiffs property& (Mot. at p. 2:11-13.) Ana Maria Garcia and Maria Ponce de Leon Defendants assert that Ana Maria Garcia and Maria Ponce de Leon were not present at either of the two protests in question. (Mot. at p. 2:17-18.) In her supporting declaration, Ana Maria Garcia states that I did not participate in the protest that took place on January 16, 2021. I did not participate in the planning or organization of the January 16, 2021, protest in any way. (Ana Maria Garcia Decl., ¶ 5.) Ana Maria Garcia further states that I did not participate in the protest that took place on February 20, 2021. I did not participate in the planning or organization of the February 20, 2021, protest in any way. (Ana Maria Garcia Decl., ¶ 6.) In addition, Maria Ponce de Leon states in her supporting declaration that I did not participate in the protests that took place on January 16, 2021, or February 20, 2021, in front of the Plaintiffs home. (Maria Ponce de Leon Decl., ¶ 6.) Maria Ponce de Leon states that I did not participate in the planning or organization of either the January 16, 2021, or the February 20, 2021 [sic], in front of the Plaintiffs home in any way. (Maria Ponce de Leon Decl., ¶ 7.) January 16, 2021 Protest Defendants assert that [t]he remaining Defendants that did attend the January 16, 2021, protest Reina Estrada, Leslie Herrera, Guillermo Garcia, and Maria Xocoy - did not commit or condone any trespass or damage to Plaintiffs property. (Mot. at p. 2:18-20.) In their respective supporting declarations, Leslie Herrera and Guillermo Garcia state, I participated in a protest outside the vicinity of Plaintiffs home located at 11502 Missouri on January 16, 2021. That day, I met other protest participants at a nearby park in the morning, and I walked with about thirty other protestors to the public area outside the Plaintiffs house, holding signs and banners&The entire protest, I stayed on public property... (Herrera Decl.; Guillermo Decl., ¶¶ 5, 7.) In her supporting declaration, Reina Estrada states that [d]uring the January 16, 2021, protest, protest attendees protested outside Marzwells home and I observed other attendees post signs outside of the parts of Marzwells property that were accessible from the public sidewalk&On January 16, 2021, I did not post any signs on Marzwells property, and I stayed on public property, either on the street or sidewalk. (Estrada Decl., ¶¶ 7-8.) In her supporting declaration, Maria Xocoy states that [f]or both protests, I stayed on public property on the street and the curb. I did not stick or tape any signs on the Plaintiffs property. (Xocoy Decl., ¶ 7.) February 20, 2021 Protest Defendants assert that [o]nly Reina Estrada and Maria Xocoy attended the second protest that occurred on February 20, 2021, and neither of them committed or condoned trespass or damage to Plaintiffs property or the actions of one lone protestor who engaged in threatening behavior& (Mot. at p. 2:21-23.)[4] In their supporting declarations, Reina Estrada and Maria Xocoy state that they took part in the protest on February 20, 2021. (Estrada Decl., ¶ 5; Xocoy Decl., ¶ 5.) Reina Estrada and Maria Xocoy state in their respective declarations that during the February 20, 2021 protest, one individual protestor jumped over Aaron Marzwells gate. I do not know the identity of this individual and had never spoken to him personally. I had no knowledge that he would jump over Aaron Marzwells gate or take any other actions on areas of private property which were fenced off or locked behind doors. (Estrada Decl., ¶ 10; Xocoy Decl., ¶ 9.) Reina Estrada further states in her declaration I did not instruct, assist or encourage any of the protestors to enter Marzwells gated private property, cause damage to Marzwells property, or place any objects to the exits and entrances to Marzwells residence so as to block ingress or egress. (Estrada Decl., ¶ 15.) Maria Xocoy states that [f]or both protests, I stayed on public property on the street and the curb. I did not stick or tape any signs on the Plaintiffs property. I did not yell vulgarities or obscenities. (Xocoy Decl., ¶ 7.) Second Cause of Action for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiffs suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendants outrageous conduct. A defendants conduct is outrageous when it is so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. And the defendants conduct must be intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result. (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051 [internal quotations and citations omitted].) Defendants assert that Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, Leslie Hererra, and Maria Ponce de Leon are entitled to summary adjudication on the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because none of them were present at the February 20, 2021, protest where Plaintiff argues actions giving rise to liability took place& (Mot. at p. 2:13-16.) In the second cause of action of the FAC, Plaintiffs allege that on or about February 20, 2021, Defendants, and each of them, committed outrageous acts or had others commit on their behalf outrageous acts& (FAC, ¶ 22.) As set forth above, Leslie Herrera and Guillermo Garcia state that they did not participate in the protest that took place on February 20, 2021. (Herrera Decl., ¶ 8; Garcia Decl., ¶ 8.) Ana Maria Garcia states that I did not participate in the protest that took place on February 20, 2021. (Ana Maria Garcia Decl., ¶ 6.) In addition, Maria Ponce de Leon states that I did not participate in the protest[] that took place on&February 20, 2021, in front of the Plaintiffs home. (Maria Ponce de Leon Decl., ¶ 6.) In addition, Defendants assert that Reina Estrada and Maria Xocoy are entitled to summary adjudication on the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress because there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to meet the elements of this cause of action& (Mot. at p. 2:20-22.) Defendants assert that none of the actions Reina Estrada and Maria Xocoy took, or that any of the protestors took, apart from the lone protestor who jumped over Plaintiffs gate, constitute the extreme and outrageous behavior necessary successfully assert a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Mot. at p. 9:18-21.) As discussed, Reina Estrada states that [d]uring the February 20, 2021 [sic], one individual protestor jumped over Aaron Marzwells gate. I do not know the identity of this individual and had never spoken to him personally. I had no knowledge that he would jump over Aaron Marzwells gate or take any other actions on areas of private property which were fenced off or locked behind doors. (Estrada Decl., ¶ 10.) Reina Estrada states that I did not instruct, assist or encourage any of the protestors to enter Marzwells gated private property, cause damage to Marzwells property, or place any objects to the exits and entrances to Marzwells residence so as to block ingress or egress. (Estrada Decl., ¶ 15.) In addition, in her supporting declaration, Maria Xocoy states that [f]or both protests, I stayed on public property on the street and the curb. I did not stick or tape any signs on the Plaintiffs property. I did not yell vulgarities or obscenities. (Xocoy Decl., ¶ 7.) Maria Xocoy further states that [d]uring the second protest on February 20, 2021, one individual protestor jumped over Aaron Marzwells gate. I do not know the identity of this individual and had never spoken to him personally. I had no knowledge that he would jump over Aaron Marzwells gate or take any other actions on areas of private property which were fenced off or locked behind doors. (Xocoy Decl., ¶ 9.) Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiffs first and second causes of action are without merit. In the opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiffs assert that [o]n January 16, 2021, numerous individuals trespassed on Plaintiffs private property and glued flyers and posters to the stucco building and garage, resulting in property damage. Similarly, and to a much more egregious degree, during the February 20, 2021 mob, numerous individuals trespassed on Plaintiffs private property and again glued flyers and posters to the stucco building and garage, resulting in property damage. (Oppn at p. 13:10-15.) However, Plaintiffs do not appear to identify what individuals they are referring to. In his supporting declaration, Aaron Marzwell states that [t]he first attack at my home occurred on January 16, 2021, when Defendants, and each them, by way of the LATU on behalf of the Madison Tenants Association, organized a mob to deface and trespass on my primary residence. (Marzwell Decl., ¶ 29.) Mr. Marzwell states that [d]uring this incident, on January 16, 2021, numerous individuals trespassed on my private property and glued flyers and posters to the stucco building and garage, resulting in property damage. (Marzwell Decl., ¶ 30.) However, Mr. Marzwell does not appear to identify what individuals he is referring to. Mr. Marzwell also states that [t]he second attack on my residence occurred on February 20, 2021, when Defendants, and each them, by way of the LATU on acting on behalf of the Madison Tenants Association, again organized a mob to further threaten, bully, harass, deface, and trespass on my primary residence. Like at the first mob, numerous individuals trespassed on my private property and glued flyers and posters to the stucco building and garage, resulting in property damage. (Marzwell Decl., ¶ 31.) However, Mr. Marzwell again does not appear to identify what individuals he is referring to. As to Reina Estrada specifically, Mr. Marzwell states that true and correct copies of photos of Estrada trespassing on my property on February 20, 2021 are attached to the Compendium of Exhibits as Exhibit 27& (Marzwell Decl., ¶ 31, Ex. 27.) In the reply, Defendants concede that Defendant Reina Estrada engaged in trespassing of a de minimis nature by posting signs on Aaron Marzwells garage where the garage abutted a public sidewalk. (Reply at p. 11:8-9.) However, Plaintiffs do not appear to point to any evidence that Leslie Hererra, Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, Maria Ponce de Leon, or Maria Xocoy purportedly engaged in an unauthorized entry onto the subject property. (Civic Western Corp. v. Zila Industries, Inc., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 16.) Indeed, in the opposition, Plaintiffs concede that even if none of the other defendants physically trespassed on private property during the mobs, which Plaintiffs neither confirm nor deny, as they do not have sufficient information to make that determination, every defendant can be held liable for tortious acts committed by other members of the violent mob& (Oppn at p. 18:11-14, emphasis added.) Plaintiffs also assert that Defendants&engaged in egregious and severe acts that give rise to the cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Oppn at p. 15:15-17.) In his supporting declaration, Mr. Marzwell states that [o]n February 20, 2021, the mobsters yelled obscenities and vulgarities towards me while my family and I, including my three minor children, were inside& (Marzwell Decl., ¶ 32.) However, Mr. Marzwell does not appear to identify who the referenced mobsters are. (Ibid.) It is unclear from Mr. Marzwells declaration if the unidentified mobsters include Defendants. Mr. Marzwell also states that [a]n individual, acting on behalf of Defendants, climbed the 7-foot tall entry of the property and opened the gate to allow other mobsters to push furniture into the entryway blocking the ability of my family and me to leave the property and seek safety. (Marzwell Decl., ¶ 33.) Mr. Marzwell states that [t]he individual who opened the gate, accompanied by Ramirez, whom all the deposed defendants admitted to knowing and who attended the meeting with the Madison Property tenants, yelled into bullhorns, made loud noises and used vulgarities, and threatened me with physical violence. (Marzwell Decl., ¶ 34.) However, Plaintiffs do not appear to assert that this referenced individual includes any of the Defendants. It is unclear how the actions of a separate individual result in the Defendants here engaging in intentional infliction of emotional distress, and Plaintiffs do not appear to cite any legal authority to support such proposition. Plaintiffs also assert in the opposition that Defendants, and each of them, by way of the pre-meditated mob, engaged in behavior that can best be described as assault or conspiracy to commit assault and/or trespass. (Oppn at p. 14:18-19.) As an initial matter, Plaintiffs FAC does not allege causes of action for assault, conspiracy to commit assault, or conspiracy to commit trespass. The Court notes that [t]he pleadings set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment. (Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 289 [internal quotations omitted].) [S]ummary judgment cannot be denied on a ground not raised by the pleadings. (Id. at p. 290 [internal emphasis omitted].) In the opposition, Plaintiffs also assert that each defendant is liable for the collective actions of the mob. (Oppn at p. 15:19.) First, Plaintiffs assert that there is a clear agency relationship between the tenants at the Madison Property and the LATU.[5] (Oppn at p. 17:4-5.) Plaintiffs cite to Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 953, 969, where the Court of Appeal noted that a principal may be liable for the wrongful conduct of its agent, even if that conduct is criminal, in one of three ways: (1) if the principal directly authorizes & [the tort or] crime to be committed; (2) if the agent commits the tort in the scope of his employment and in performing service on behalf of the principal, regardless of whether the wrong is authorized or ratified by [the principal], and even if the wrong is criminal; or (3) if the principal ratifies its agents conduct after the fact by&voluntar[ily] elect[ing] to adopt the [agents] conduct & as its own. (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Plaintiffs assert that [t]he tenants at the Madison Property enlisted the help of the LATU to resolve their issues with Owner. (Oppn at p. 17:5-7.) But the Court does not see how this shows that Defendants are purportedly liable for the wrongful conduct of [their] agent, which Plaintiffs appear to assert is LATU. (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.) Plaintiffs do not appear to argue that LATU engaged in trespass or intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition, Plaintiffs do not appear to explain how Defendants purportedly directly authorize[d]&[the tort or] crime to be committed, how LATU purportedly commit[ted] the tort in the scope of his employment and in performing service on behalf of the principal, or how Defendants ratifie[d] [their] agents conduct after the fact by&voluntar[ily] elect[ing] to adopt the [agents] conduct&as [their] own. (Ibid. [internal quotations omitted].) Next, Plaintiffs assert that the mobsters were acting within their scope of association with the LATU and were performing these attacks on behalf of the tenants of the Madison Property. (Oppn at p. 17:27-28.) The Court notes that it is unclear who the referenced mobsters are, and if Plaintiffs reference to mobsters pertains to each of the Defendants. In addition, Plaintiffs do not cite any legal authority supporting the proposition that Defendants are liable for trespass or intentional infliction of emotional distress here because they were purportedly acting within their scope of association with the LATU... (Oppn at p. 17:27.) In addition, in the motion, Defendants cite to NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. (1982) 458 U.S. 886, 920, where the United States Supreme Court noted that [c]ivil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence. For liability to be imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to further those illegal aims. Here, Plaintiffs do not appear to argue or provide evidence showing that the LATU or the Madison Tenants Union possessed unlawful goals or that Defendants held a specific intent to further any such illegal aims. In the opposition, Plaintiffs do not appear to address this holding in NAACP. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of material fact as to whether Reina Estrada trespassed onto the subject Property. The Court does not find that Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of material fact as to the first cause of action for trespass as to Leslie Hererra, Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, Maria Ponce de Leon, or Maria Xocoy. In addition, the Court does not find that Plaintiffs have raised a triable issue of material fact as to any of the Defendants as to the second cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Conclusion Based on the foregoing, Defendants motion for summary judgment is denied. Defendants motion for summary adjudication is granted as to first cause of action of the FAC as to Leslie Hererra, Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, Maria Ponce de Leon, and Maria Xocoy. Defendants motion for summary adjudication is denied as to first cause of action of the FAC as to Reina Estrada. Defendants motion for summary adjudication is granted as to the second cause of action off the FAC as to each of the Defendants - Leslie Hererra, Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, Reina Estrada, Maria Ponce de Leon, and Maria Xocoy. The Court orders Leslie Hererra, Guillermo Garcia, Ana Maria Garcia, Maria Ponce de Leon, and Maria Xocoy to file and serve a proposed judgment within 10 days of the date of this Order.¿¿¿¿ Defendants are ordered to provide notice of this Order. DATED: August 1, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court [1]The names Roey Marzwell, Annette Marzwell, and Leo Marzwell appear to be misspelled in certain parts of the FAC. [2]Defendants state that [t]his motion does not seek summary judgment on behalf of the remaining Defendant, Tony Ramirez. (Mot. at p. 3:3-4.) [3]In the FAC, Plaintiffs refer to Roey Marzwell, Annette Marzwell, and Leo Marzwell collectively as the Minors. (FAC, ¶ 1.) [4]In their respective supporting declarations, Leslie Herrera and Guillermo Garcia state that they did not participate in the protest that took place on February 20, 2021. (Herrera Decl., ¶ 8; Garcia Decl., ¶ 8.) [5]Plaintiffs do not appear to define the acronym LATU in the memorandum of points and authorities in support of the opposition.

Ruling

MOCHE ZIV, ET AL., VS HERTZEL ILLULIAN, ET AL.,

Aug 02, 2024 |6/18/2022 |SC124878

Case Number: SC124878 Hearing Date: August 2, 2024 Dept: I The court has been in communication with the referee, Judge Horn. Judge Horn reminded the court that his wife served as an alternate juror in Illulian v. Rav-Noy, Case No., SC123117. In that case, by stipulation, alternates were allowed to sit in the jury room (but not participate in deliberations). There is a motion for a new trial pending before the court in that case and in papers recently submitted Judge Horns wife has signed a declaration relevant thereto. Although the court and Judge Horn are confident that Judge Horn could be fair and impartial and unbiased, both believe that in an abundance of caution and given these unusual circ*mstances it is better to allow either party to request that a new referee be appointed. The court therefore requests the parties to file a JOINT statement within 10 court days that says either A new referee is requested or Both parties waive any potential conflict. If the former is issued, the parties are not to disclose who seeks a new referee. Should that occur, the court will vacate the current order of reference and the next referee on the list will be next in order. The court also is concerned that defendants are now unrepresented and that as a result Illulian has not done what is needed in the reference. If that continues with the referee, the court will consider vacating the reference, holding Illulian in default, and issuing a judgment consistent with Zivs request, or, in the alternative, allowing Ziv to request monetary damages based on the diminution of the value of his property. The court reminds Illulian that the Zivs are competent to testify as to the diminution of the value of his own property, but Illulian will not be competent to rebut that testimony without retaining an expert.

Ruling

ABIMAEL G. GARCIA VS BEST FOR YOU MOVING, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Aug 01, 2024 |24NWCV00210

Case Number: 24NWCV00210 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: C GARCIA v. BEST FOR YOU MOVING CASE NO.: 24NWCV00210 HEARING: 08/01/24 #7 Plaintiff ABIMAEL G. GARCIAs unopposed application for right to attach order and writ of attachment against Defendant ARTUR SHAKHNZAROV is GRANTED. An undertaking of $10,000.00 is ordered as provided for by statute. Moving Party to give notice. No Opposition filed as of July 29, 2024. Plaintiff ABIMAEL G. GARCIA (Plaintiff) applies for a writ of attachment against Defendant ARTUR SHAKHNAZAROV (Defendant) in the amount of $860,384.56. Plaintiff filed this action on January 22, 2024 against Defendants BEST FOR YOU MOVING (Best for You); and ARTUR SHAKHNAZAROV (Guarantor). This case is based on Best for Yous breach and default of its commercial lease of real property owned by Plaintiff, and Defendant/Guarantors guaranty of said commercial lease. The application [for a writ of attachment] shall be supported by an affidavit showing that the plaintiff on the facts presented would be entitled to a judgment on the claim upon which the attachment is based. (CCP §484.030.) The declarations in the moving papers must contain evidentiary facts, stated with particularity and based on actual personal knowledge with all documentary evidence properly identified and authenticated. (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 76, 79-80.) In contested applications, the court must consider the relative merits of the positions of the respective parties and make a determination of the probable outcome of the litigation. (Id. at 80.) At the hearing, the court shall consider the showing made by the parties appearing and shall issue a right to attach order, which shall state the amount to be secured by the attachment determined by the court in accordance with Section 483.015 or 483.020, if it finds all of the following: 1. The claim upon which the attachment is based is one upon which an attachment may be issued 2. The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim upon which the attachment is based 3. The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based. (CCP § 484.090(a).) The court's determinations shall be made upon the basis of the pleadings and other papers in the record; but, upon good cause shown, the court may receive and consider at the hearing additional evidence, oral or documentary, and additional points and authorities, or it may continue the hearing for the production of the additional evidence or points and authorities. (CCP § 484.090(d).) CLAIM: An attachment may be issued only in an action on a claim or claims for money, each of which is based upon a contract, express or implied, where the total amount of the claim or claims is a fixed or readily ascertainable amount not less than five hundred dollars ($500) exclusive of costs, interest, and attorney's fees. (CCP 483.010.) Plaintiff's claim against a natural person must arise out of the defendant's conduct of a trade, business or profession. (CCP § 483.010(c); Kadison, Pfaelzer, Woodard, Quinn & Rossi v. Wilson (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 1, 4. CCP 483.010.) The court has the power to determine disputed facts on the basis of preponderance of evidence as disclosed in the declarations. (Hobbs v. Weiss (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 76, 80.) The claim is for money and based upon written agreements, whose total sums are more than $500. The claim is supported by the declaration of Abimael Garcia, attesting that Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an Agreement, that Defendant Best for You is in default, and that Defendant Shakhnazarov failed to perform his duties under the guaranty of the commercial lease. Plaintiffs application indicates that the claim arises out of a debt owed by Defendants trade, business, or profession. The claim is proper. PROBABLE VALIDITY: A claim has probable validity where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (CCP § 481.190.) Plaintiff has established probable validity of its claim by presenting evidence of the Invoices between the parties. This application is unopposed. Based on a preponderance of the evidence, the court finds Plaintiffs claim has probable validity because it is more likely than not that Plaintiff will obtain a judgment. PURPOSE OF ATTACHMENT: The attachment is not sought for a purpose other than the recovery on the claim upon which the attachment is based. AMOUNT OF WRIT: The writ will issue for the amount of the claimed indebtedness, plus an amount to cover costs and allowable attorney fees as determined by the court reduced by& any security interest held by plaintiff in defendant's property. (CCP § 483.015.) A writ of attachment issued without the mandated bond is void. (Vershbow v. Reiner (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 879, 882.) Defendant must produce detailed, factual declarations showing the nature and extent of the claimed offset. (Weil & Brown, Civil Procedure Before Trial at 9:933.) The amount of the writ against Defendant is $860,384.56 and an undertaking of $10,000.00 is ordered as provided by statute. (CCP § 489.220.)

Ruling

BMW BANK OF NORTH AMERICA, A UTAH INDUSTRIAL BANK, BY AND THROUGH ITS SERVICER, BMW FINANCIAL SERVICES NA, LLC, A DELAWARE LI VS AUSTIN BAKER, AN INDIVIDUAL

Aug 01, 2024 |24LBCV00531

Case Number: 24LBCV00531 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: S25 Background On March 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant Baker, alleging (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Common Count; (3) Claim & Delivery; and (4) Conversion. Defendant Baker was personally served but has not filed a responsive pleading. On May 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant application for writ of possession. As of July 31, 2024, no opposition has been filed. Request for Judicial Notice The Court grants Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibit 4 attached to the Declaration of Sarah Phillips in Support of Application for Writ of Possession pursuant to Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (g) and (h). Legal Standard Upon the filing of the complaint or at any time thereafter, the plaintiff may apply pursuant to this chapter for a writ of possession by filing a written application for the writ with the court in which the action is brought. (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (a).) The application shall be executed under oath and shall include all of the following: [¶] (1)¿A showing of the basis of the plaintiffs claim and that the plaintiff is entitled to possession of the property claimed. If the basis of the plaintiffs claim is a written instrument, a copy of the instrument shall be attached. [¶] (2)¿A showing that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, of the manner in which the defendant came into possession of the property, and, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the reason for the detention. [¶] (3)¿A particular description of the property and a statement of its value. [¶] (4)¿A statement, according to the best knowledge, information, and belief of the plaintiff, of the location of the property and, if the property, or some part of it, is within a private place which may have to be entered to take possession, a showing that there is probable cause to believe that such property is located there. [¶] (5)¿A statement that the property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to a statute; or seized under an execution against the property of the plaintiff; or, if so seized, that it is by statute exempt from such seizure. (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.010, subd. (b).) Prior to the hearing required by subdivision (a) of Section 512.020, the defendant shall be served with all of the following: [¶] (1)¿A copy of the summons and complaint. [¶] (2)¿A Notice of Application and Hearing. [¶] (3)¿A copy of the application and any affidavit in support thereof. (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.030, subd. (a).) Discussion Requirements of Code of Civil Procedure Section 512.010 Plaintiff identifies the basis of its claim to be a written agreement for the restoration of 2022 BMW M550XI motor vehicle, Serial No. WBA13BK0XNCJ57333 (the Subject Vehicle). (Phillips Decl., ¶¶ 8-22, Ex. 1.) Plaintiff demonstrates that it is entitled to possession of the Subject Vehicle by providing a copy of its registered title for the Subject Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 10, Ex. 2.) Plaintiff states it is authorized to bring this action on behalf of Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of a separate servicing agreement and power of attorney. (Id. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff establishes that the Subject Vehicle is wrongfully detained by Defendant Baker. (Id. ¶¶ 13-17.) Plaintiff provides that on or about March 12, 2022, Defendant Austin Baker entered into a written motor vehicle lease agreement with BMW of El Cajon, for valuable consideration regarding the Subject Vehicle. (Id. ¶ 8, Ex. 1.) Upon Defendant Bakers default of failure and refusal to pay the monthly payments, Plaintiff may repossess the vehicle if done so peacefully and the law allows it pursuant to paragraph 3(d). (Id., Ex. 1 p.4.) The vehicle sought to be attached is a 2022 BMW M550XI motor vehicle, Serial No. WBA13BK0XNCJ57333, estimated to be worth between $61,866.00. (Phillips Decl., ¶ 20, Ex. 4.) Plaintiff provides that, upon full review of Plaintiffs records, it believes that the Subject Vehicle was located at Defendant Bakers residence address, 1069 W. 27th St., San Pedro, CA 90731. (Id. ¶ 19.) Plaintiff provides that the Subject Property has not been taken for a tax, assessment, or fine, pursuant to statute. (Application at p. 2, ¶ 8.) Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure section 512.010. Service Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 512.030 On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed a proof of service for the summons and complaint on May 20, 2024. On the same date, Plaintiff also filed a proof of service for the notice of application and hearing, application, and affidavits on May 20, 2024. Plaintiff has complied with the requirements of 512.030. Issues at Hearing At the hearing, a writ of possession shall issue if both of the following are found: [¶] (1) The plaintiff has established the probable validity of the plaintiffs claim to possession of the property. [¶] (2) The undertaking requirements of Section 515.010 are satisfied. (Code Civ. Proc., § 512.060, subd. (a).) A claim has probable validity where it is more likely than not that the plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on that claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 511.090.) A writ of possession shall not issue unless the plaintiff files an undertaking in an amount not less than twice the value of the defendant's interest in the property or in a greater amount. (Code Civ. Proc., § 515.010(a).) Plaintiff states that no equity exists for Defendant Baker because Defendant Baker owes more than the value of the Subject Vehicle. (Phillips Decl., ¶ 21.) Plaintiff requests that Defendant Baker be required to post a re-delivery bond in the sum of $71,000.00, which is the account balance, and includes an estimated $1,000.00 for attorneys fees and court costs. (Ibid.) Plaintiff has established the probable validity of its claim to possession of the property through the registered title for the subject vehicle. (Phillips Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 2.) In compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010, subdivision (b), the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant has no interest in the property and the court waives the requirement of the plaintiffs undertaking and that Defendant Baker be required to post a re-delivery bond in the sum of $71,000.00, which is the account balance, and includes an estimated $1,000.00 for attorneys fees and court costs and shall include in the order for issuance of the writ the amount of the defendants undertaking sufficient to satisfy the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 515.020. Tentative Ruling Plaintiffs application for writ of possession is GRANTED. Plaintiff has established the probable validity of its claim to possession of the property through the registered title for the subject vehicle. (Phillips Decl., ¶ 10, Ex. 2.) In compliance with Code of Civil Procedure section 515.010, subdivision (b), the Court finds that Plaintiff has demonstrated that the defendant has no interest in the property and the court waives the requirement of the plaintiffs undertaking and that Defendant Baker be required to post a re-delivery bond in the sum of $71,000.00, which is the account balance, and includes an estimated $1,000.00 for attorneys fees and court costs pursuant to the requirements of subdivision (b) of Section 515.020. Plaintiffs submitted Order for Writ of Possession After Hearing is signed by the Court

Ruling

GOLTHA GREEN ET AL VS GILFERT JACKSON ET AL

Jul 30, 2024 |BC548724

Case Number: BC548724 Hearing Date: July 30, 2024 Dept: 82 Goltha Green, et al. v. Gilfert Jackson, et al. Case No. BC548724 [Tentative] Order Granting Motion to Remove and Expunge Lis Pendens Defendant Ridgeley Drive Apartments, LLC (Defendant or Ridgeley) moves for an order to remove and expunge the Notice of Pendency of Action (Lis Pendens) recorded on August 10, 2025, as Instrument No. 20150974994 with respect to this action and following real properties: 1. 2501-2512 1⁄2 W. 54th Street, 5355-5363 1⁄2 3rd Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90043 2. 2419 South Ridgeley Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90016 3. 750 W. Imperial Highway, Los Angeles, CA 90044 4. 2425-31 Ridgeley Drive, Los Angeles, CA 90016 At any time after notice of pendency of action has been recorded, any party, or any nonparty with an interest in the real property affected thereby, may apply to the court in which the action is pending to expunge the notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.30.) [T]he court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. The court shall not order an undertaking to be given as a condition of expunging the notice if the court finds the claimant has not established the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc. § 405.32.) In this wrongful foreclosure action, Plaintiff Goltha Green alleged that JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Chase) wrongfully foreclosed on the four multi-family properties specified in the Lis Pendens. After a bench trial, the trial court (Beckloff, J.) entered judgment in favor of Chase and several other defendants, including foreclosure purchaser Ridgeley. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeal in an unpublished opinion filed on August 24, 2023. (See Burch Decl. Exh. 2-3.) The judgment, affirmed on appeal, conclusively determines that the real property claims set forth in the complaint lack probable validity. (See generally Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. v. Founding Members of Newport Beach Country Club (2006) 140 Cap.App.4th 1120, 1126-32 [discussing rules of res judicata].) Plaintiff has not filed an opposition and has developed no argument to the contrary. Accordingly, the Lis Pendens must be expunged. Based upon the foregoing, the court orders as follows: 1. Ridgeley Drive Apartments, LLCs motion to remove and expunge the lis pendens is granted. 2. The court shall sign the separate, proposed order. 3. Counsel for Ridgely Drive Apartments, LLC shall provide notice and file proof of service with the court.

Ruling

KINDLE CRIGLER, ET AL. VS BRECKENRIDGE PROPERTY FUND 2016, LLC, A LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Aug 01, 2024 |24PSCV00548

Case Number: 24PSCV00548 Hearing Date: August 1, 2024 Dept: G Defendant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLCs Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens or in the Alternative, Require Plaintiff to Post a Bond Respondent: NO OPPOSITION Defendant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLCs Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint Respondent: NO OPPOSITION Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporations Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint Respondent: NO OPPOSITION TENTATIVE RULING Defendant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLCs Motion to Expunge Lis Pendens is GRANTED and costs are awarded in the amount of $397.50. Defendant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLCs Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint and Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporations Demurrer to Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint are CONTINUED to a date to be determined at the hearing in Department G (Pomona). Defendants Counsel are also ordered to meet and confer with Plaintiffs regarding the present demurrers and to file a supplemental declaration describing such meet and confer efforts at least (9) court days before the next scheduled hearing. BACKGROUND This is an action to quiet title. In November 1987, Plaintiff Shelia Crigler and William Crigler purchased a property in Pomona. To finance their purchase, they obtained a secured loan and subsequently mortgaged the Pomona property for additional funds. In October 2018, they executed a quitclaim deed to convey their ownership to the Family Trust of William Robert Crigler and Shelia Vera Crigler. After William Crigler passed away in 2018, Plaintiff Kyndle Crigler assumed the mortgage payments. In 2022, the Criglers applied for and were placed on a payment plan by Defendant PHH Mortgage Corporation (PHH). In April 2023, PHH removed the Criglers from the repayment plan after they allegedly failed to pay timely property charge expenses. While the Criglers allege they attempted to make payment toward the amount demanded by PHH, PHH proceeded with nonjudicial foreclosure proceedings. On December 4, 2023, Defendant Breckenridge Property Fund 2016, LLC (Breckenridge) purchased the Pomona property at a foreclosure auction. On February 21, 2024, the Criglers filed a complaint against Breckenridge, First American Title Insurance Company (First American), PHH, and Does 1-20, alleging the following causes of action: (1) quiet title, (2) cancellation of written instrument, (3) wrongful foreclosure, (4) declaratory relief, (5) slander of title, and (6) negligent misrepresentation. On May 13, 2024, the Court sustained a demurrer to the Complaint by Breckenridge. On June 3, 2024, the Criglers filed a First Amended Complaint (FAC) against the same defendants alleging the same causes of action. On June 7, 2024, Breckenridge filed the present motion to expunge lis pendens. On June 17, 2024, Breckenridge filed the present demurrer. On July 3, 2024, PHH also filed a demurrer to the FAC. A hearing on the present motions is set for August 1, 2024, along with a case management conference. MOTION TO EXPUNGE LIS PENDENS Breckenridge moves to expunge a notice of lis pendens that has been recorded against 1615 California Place, Pomona, California 91768 (Pomona property). For the following reasons, the court GRANTS their motion. Legal Standard Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.30, a party may move to expunge a notice of lis pendens and the burden of proof rests with the claimant. Code of Civil Procedure section 405.31 states the court must expunge a notice of lis pendens if the pleading on which the notice is based does not contain a real property claim. If the pleading does contain a real property claim, the court shall order that the notice be expunged if the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 405.32.) Discussion In this case, the Criglers failed to file a timely opposition to the present motion. Because they have the burden of establishing the existence of a real property claim and that claims probable validity, the court GRANTS Breckenridges motion. Breckenridge also requests the award of attorney fees for making the present motion. Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 405.38, a party prevailing on a motion to expunge a notice of lis pendens shall be awarded the reasonable attorneys fees and costs of making or opposing the motion unless the court finds that the other party acted with substantial justification or that other circ*mstances make the imposition of attorney's fees and costs unjust. Utilizing the lodestar approach and in light of the totality of the circ*mstances, the court awards reasonable attorney fees and costs to Breckenridge in the amount of $397.50 ($337.50 for 1.5 hours drafting the motion and attending the hearing at an hourly rate of $225.00 plus $60.00 in filing fees). DEMURRERS Breckenridge demurs to the Criglers first cause of action (quiet title), second cause of action (cancellation of instruments), and fourth cause of action (declaratory relief). PHH demurs to the Criglers third cause of action (wrongful foreclosure), fourth cause of action (declaratory relief), fifth cause of action (slander of title), and sixth cause of action (negligent misrepresentation). For the following reasons, the court finds the parties did not adequately meet and confer. Legal Standard Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a), prior to filing a demurrer, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person or by telephone with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. This section further provides that the demurring party shall identify all of the specific causes of action that it believes are subject to demurrer and identify with legal support the basis of the deficiencies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41, subd. (a)(1).) While Code of Civil Procedure section 430.41, subdivision (a)(4) makes clear failing to meet and confer is not grounds to overrule a demurrer, courts are not required to ignore defects in the meet and confer process and if the court determines no meet and confer has taken place, or concludes further conferences between counsel would likely be productive, it retains discretion to order counsel to meaningfully discuss the pleadings with an eye toward reducing the number of issues or eliminating the need for a demurrer, and to continue the hearing date to facilitate that effort. (Dumas v. Los Angeles County Bd. of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355 & fn. 3.) Discussion In this case, Breckenridges counsel attempted to meet and confer by sending emails to the Criglers counsel. PHHs counsel also attempted to meet and confer by sending emails to the Criglers and their counsel. Because emails are not a code-compliant form of meeting and conferring and counsel has not described any attempt to contact counsel or the Criglers by telephone, the court finds a continuance to further meet and confer is appropriate. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, Breckenridges motion to expunge lis pendens is GRANTED and costs are awarded in the amount of $397.50. Furthermore, Breckenridges and PHHs demurrers are CONTINUED to a date to be determined at the hearing in Department G (Pomona). Breckenridges counsel and PHHs counsel are also ordered to meet and confer with the Criglers regarding the present demurrer and to file a supplemental declaration describing such meet and confer efforts at least nine (9) court days before the next scheduled hearing.

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